

CONCLUSION

Four British Folkways in America: The Origin and Persistence of Regional Cultures in the United States

Colonies then are the Seeds of Nations, begun and nourished by the care of wise and populous Countries; as conceiving them best for the increase of Humane Stock.

—William Penn, 1681

INDEPENDENCE DID NOT MARK THE END of the four British folkways in America, or of the regional cultures which they inspired. The history of the United States is, in many ways the story of their continuing interaction. Most broad areas of consensus in American life have grown from values that these cultures shared in common. Many major conflicts in American history have developed primarily from their differences. Every presidential election shows their persistent power in American politics. Every decennial census finds that cultural differences between American regions are greater in some ways than those between European nations.

The persistence of regional culture in the United States explains many things about American history. In particular, it helps to answer the question which led to this inquiry, about the determinants of a voluntary society. By way of a summary and conclusion, it might be useful to examine in a general way the origins and development of the four British folkways, and their relationship with the main lines of American history from the great migrations of the seventeenth century, to our own time.

☛ Genesis: The British Reconnaissance of North America

In the beginning, there was a neglected half-century of Anglo-American history which preceded the four great migrations. From 1580 to 1630, more than thirty English settlements were planted in what is now the eastern United States. Many survived, and a few remain culturally distinctive even today.¹

On Smith and Tangier islands in the Chesapeake Bay, for example, immigrants from the far southwest of Britain founded a culture which still preserves the dialect of seventeenth century Cornwall and Devon (*zink* for sink, *noyce* for nice). At Plymouth in southeastern New England, another variety of English culture

¹Atlantic settlements planted in the present United States between 1606 and 1625 include:

State	Date by	Settlement	Location	Leader	
Me.	1607	Sagadahoc	Kennebec River	George Popham	
	1612	St. Croix	St. Croix Island	Jesuit Mission	
	1612	St. Johns	near Calais	Men of St. Malo	
	1613	St. Sauveur	Mt. Desert Island	Pierre Biard	
	1613	Matinicus	near Mt. Desert I.	Fishermen	
	1616	Winter Harbor	Saco River	Richard Vines	
	1622	Damariscove	Damariscove Island	Sir Ferd. Gorges	
	1622	Monhegan	Monhegan Island	Fishermen	
	1622	Isle of Shoals	Isle of Shoals	Fishermen	
	1623	Quack	York	Chris. Levett	
	1623	Cape Newagen	Boothbay	Fishermen	
	1623	Pemaquid	Pemaquid Point	Fishermen	
	N.H.	1623	Rendezvous Pt.	Odiorne's Point	David Thomson
		1623	Cochecho	Dover	Wm. and Ed. Hilton
	Mass.	1620	New Plymouth	Plymouth	John Carver
1622		Wessagusset	Weymouth	Thos. Weston	
1622		Natascot	Hull	John Lyford	
1623		Nantasket	Nantasket	Thomas Gray	
1623		Cape Ann	Gloucester	Thos. Gardner	
1623		Wessagusset	Weymouth	Robert Gorges	
1624		Conant's I.	Mass. Bay	Roger Conant	
1624		Winnissimmet	Chelsea	Samuel Maverick	
1624		Shawmut	Boston	Wm. Blackstone	
1624		Mishawum	Charlestown	Thos. Walford	
1625		Passonagesit	Quincy	Thos. Wollaston	
1626		Naumkeag	Salem	John White	
1625?		Thompson's I.	Mass. Bay	David Thomson	
Conn.	1624	E. Settlement	Connecticut River	Dutch W.I. Co.	
N.Y.	1624	Fort Nassau	Castle Island	Dutch W.I. Co.	
	1624	Fort Orange	Hudson River	Dutch W.I. Co.	
	1624	Governors I.	Governors I.	Dutch W.I. Co.	
	1625	Fort Amsterdam	Manhattan I.	Dutch W.I. Co.	
N.J.	1624	W. Settlement	Hudson River	Dutch W.I. Co.	
Pa.	1624	S. Settlement	Delaware River	Dutch W.I. Co.	
Md.	by 1625	Kent Island	Chesapeake Bay	Wm. Claiborne	
Va.	1607	Jamestown	James River	Virginia Co.	
	by 1629	Smith I.	Chesapeake Bay	Eng. Fishermen	
	by 1629	Tangier I.	Chesapeake Bay	Eng. Fishermen	

was introduced by the *Mayflower* Pilgrims who were very different from the Massachusetts Puritans; even today this small sub-region still calls itself the "Old Colony," and speaks a strain of English which is subtly distinctive from other Yankee accents. On New England's north shore from Marblehead to Maine yet another culture was planted by fishermen from Jersey, Guernsey and English channel ports; their folkways still survive in small towns and offshore islands from Kittery to the Cranberry Islands.²

In Massachusetts Bay, an eccentric Devon family called Maverick settled the present town of Chelsea and an island in Boston harbor that still bears their name. They had trouble with the Puritans and moved away, keeping one jump ahead of the larger cultures that threatened to engulf them. By the nineteenth century, the Mavericks had found their way onto the western plains. Their name was given to range cattle that bore no man's brand, and became a synonym for independent eccentricity in American speech.³

Many such "mavericks" settled America before 1630. The Balch and Conant families, to name but two, both arrived in Massachusetts before the Winthrop fleet and are still known in New England for going their own way. Altogether these earliest English settlers added color and variety to the cultural mosaic of early America. But their primary role was to prepare the way for larger groups that followed. They were the reconnaissance parties of British America.⁴

☛ Exodus: The Four Great Migrations, 1629–1750

After 1629 the major folk movements began to occur, in the series of waves that are the subject of this book. As we have seen, the first wave (1629–40) was an exodus of English Puritans who came mainly from the eastern counties and planted in Massachusetts a very special culture with unique patterns of speech and

²There is much manuscript material on early Maine in the Devon Record Office and the Exeter City Library. Some of it has been published in Robert E. Moody, ed., *The Letters of Thomas Gorges, Deputy Governor of the Province of Maine, 1640–1643* (Portland, Me., 1978); see also Daniel Vickers, "Work and Life on the Fishing Periphery of Essex County, Massachusetts, 1630–1675," *CSMP* 63 (1984), 83–118; Edwin A. Churchill, "The Founding of Maine, 1600–1640: A Revisionist Interpretation," *MEHSQ* 18 (1978), 21–54; Charles E. Clark, "The Founding of Maine, 1600–1640, A Comment," *MEHSQ* 18 (1978), 55–62.

³"Maverick," *NEHGR* 69 (1915), 146–59.

⁴Clifford K. Shipton, *Roger Conant* (Cambridge, 1945).

architecture, distinctive ideas about marriage and the family, nucleated settlements, congregational churches, town meetings, and a tradition of ordered liberty.

The second wave brought to Virginia a different set of English folkways, mainly from a broad belt of territory that extended from Kent and Devon north to Northamptonshire and Warwickshire. This culture was characterized by scattered settlements, extreme hierarchies of rank, strong oligarchies, Anglican churches, a highly developed sense of honor and an idea of hegemonic liberty.

The third wave (ca. 1675–1715) was the Friends' migration, which carried yet another culture from the England's North Midlands to the Delaware Valley. It was founded on a Christian idea of spiritual equality, a work ethic of unusual intensity, a suspicion of social hierarchy, and an austerity which Max Weber called "worldly asceticism." It also preserved many elements of North Midland speech, architecture, dress and food ways. Most important, it deliberately created a pluralistic system of reciprocal liberty in the Delaware Valley.

The fourth great migration (1717–75) came to the backcountry from the borderlands of North Britain—an area which included the Scottish lowlands, the north of Ireland and England's six northern counties. These emigrants were of different ethnic stocks, but shared a common border culture which was unique in its speech, architecture, family ways and child-rearing customs. Its material culture was marked by extreme inequalities of condition, and its public life was dominated by a distinctive ideal of natural liberty.

Each of these four folk cultures in early America had a distinctive character which was closer to its popular reputation than to many academic "reinterpretations" in the twentieth century. The people in Puritan Massachusetts were in fact highly puritanical. They were not traditional peasants, modern capitalists, village communists, modern individualists, Renaissance humanists, Victorian moralists, neo-Freudian narcissists or prototypical professors of English literature. They were a people of their time and place who had an exceptionally strong sense of themselves, and a soaring spiritual purpose which has been lost beneath many layers of revisionist scholarship.

The first gentlemen of Virginia were truly cavaliers. They were not the pasteboard protagonists of Victorian fiction, or the celluloid heroes of *Gone with the Wind*. But neither were they self-made bourgeois capitalists, modern agro-businessmen, upwardly

mobile yeomen or "plain folk." Most were younger sons of proud armigerous families with strong Royalist politics, a devout Anglican faith, decided rural prejudices, entrenched manorial ideals, exalted notions of their own honor and at least the rudiments of an Aristotelian education. The majority of Virginia's white population were indentured servants, landless tenants and poor whites—a degraded rural proletariat who had no hope of rising to the top of their society. Not a single ex-servant or son of a servant became a member of Virginia's House of Burgesses during the late seventeenth century. The mythical figures of Virginia cavaliers and poor whites were solidly founded in historical fact.

The culture of the Delaware Valley was dominated by British Quakers and German Pietists whose Christian beliefs had a special moral character. Here again, their culture has been distorted

Four English Folk Migrations: Modal Characteristics

Region of origin	East Anglia	South and West	North Midlands	Borderlands
American destination	Massachusetts	Virginia	Delaware Valley	Backcountry
Period of migration	1629-40	1642-75	1675-1715	1717-75
Duration of migration	11 years	33 years	40 years	57 years
Size of migration	21,000	ca. 45,000	23,000	ca. 250,000
Control of migration	Corporate	Royal Colony	Proprietary	Fragmented
Religion of migrants	Congregational	Anglican	Friends	Presbyterian and Anglican
Origin of immigrant elites	Puritan ministers and magistrates	Royalist younger sons of gentry and aristocracy	Quaker traders artisans and farmers	Border gentry and statesmen
Elite kin, nets and links	E. Anglian kin Cambridge net North Sea links	S. W. Eng. kin Oxford net London links	N. Midland kin Quaker net Atlantic links	Border kin Glasgow net Irish Sea links
Modal ranks of immigrants	Yeomanry and artisans	Laborers and servants	Farmers, artisans and traders	Tenants and cottagers
Occupation (% farmers)	33%	60%	40%	60%
(% artisans)	54%	30%	40%	30%
Residence: (% urban)	65%	35%	30%	20%
Sex ratio (males per 100 females)	140	500	250	160
Age composition				
(% 0-14)	31%	3%	24%	25%
(% 15-24)	26%	70%	35%	36%
(% 25-59)	42%	27%	38%	39%
(% 60 and up)	1%	0%	1%	1%
Family structure (% coming in families)	90%	20%	50%	70%

by historical revisionists who have variously “reinterpreted” them as utopian cranks, manipulative materialists, secular pluralists and the “first modern Americans.” The modernity of the Delaware Valley has been much exaggerated, and the primitive Christian roots of William Penn’s “holy experiment” have too often been forgotten.

The backsettlers also possessed a strong and vibrant culture which also has been much misunderstood. They were not ancient Celts, or wild Scotch-Irish savages, or innocent children of nature. Neither were they rootless pluralists, incipient entrepreneurs, agents of the Edinburgh enlightenment or heralds of the New South. The majority, no matter whether northern Irish, lowland Scots or North Country English, shared a culture of high integrity which had been tempered in fire of the British borderlands. The more we learn by empirical research about these four cultures of British America, the more distinctive they appear from one another, and the closer to historical “myths” which they inspired.

☛ British Origins: The Regional Factor

The origins of these cultures were highly complex, involving differences of British region, religion, rank, and generation, as well as of the American environment, and the process of migration. Let us briefly examine each of these determinants, beginning with British regions—not because this factor was more important than any other, but because it has been less clearly understood.

The idea of a region creates few practical problems for American historians, who tend normally to think in regional terms without reflecting very much about them. In English historiography, however, region remains an alien concept. The history of England is highly developed on national and local levels, but a third level is missing in between. So little has been written about the history of English regions that in a formal sense there is no regional historiography at all—that is, no established set of regional *problématiques*.⁵

⁵Signs of change appear in the founding of English journals called *Northern History* (1966), *Midland History* (1971), and *Southern History* (1979). But few articles in these journals are truly regional in nature; most run to national or local history. Even the manifestos that called these journals into being were reluctant to make strong claims for regional history. One called it “provincial history,” and argued that it should be “outward looking” rather than “inward look-

Regional history has long flourished in France, Germany, Italy, Spain and even in smaller countries such as Belgium, Switzerland, Sweden and the Netherlands. England is unique in the exceptional riches of its national and local historiography and the poverty of its regional research.⁶

This has been so not because England is more uniform than other nations, but because its internal differences are more complex. To travel across the English countryside is to be continuously surprised by the complexity of its cultural terrain. One meets many different ideas of spatial discrimination which have the collective effect of blurring regional perceptions. The leading regional ideas might be summarized in a few sentences:

Zones are topographical units popularized by Cyril Fox, who divided England into a "highland zone" (the north and west) and a "lowland zone" (the south and east), each supporting different cultures.⁷

Pays in English usage are soil regions and agricultural regimes. Leading examples are David Underdown's elegant essay on "the chalk and the cheese," and Joan Thirsk's meticulous studies of wood pasture and open pasture, "fielden, forest, fell and fen."⁸

ing" (see Asa Briggs, "Themes in Northern History," *NH* I (1966)). Only in the 1980s did the number of genuinely regional essays increase.

Other harbingers of change are centers for regional history at the universities of East Anglia, Exeter and Leeds. But again much of their work is not regional but local or national in its conception. The oldest and strongest of these centers is the Centre of East Anglian Studies at the University of East Anglia. But comparatively little of its research is devoted to the region as a unit. The largest project under way at the Centre of East Anglian studies is a building survey of Norwich—a very useful project, but not an exercise in regional history. See Janice Henney, ed., *East Anglian Studies: Theses Completed* (Norwich, 1982).

Still, the important beginnings have been made. A new series of monographs on English regional history began to appear in 1986—another sign of growing interest in this field.

⁶John Langton, an English geographer who is swimming against the tide, writes that "relatively little regional geography has been written about England"; see "The Industrial Revolution and the Regional Geography of England," *IGBT*, n.s. 9 (1984), 145–67. Strong arguments against regional models have come from British geographers and historians, at the same time that colleagues in other nations have been moving the other way. See G.H.T. Kimble, "The Inadequacy of the Regional Concept," in L. D. Stamp and S. W. Wooldridge, eds., *London Essays in Geography* (London, 1951). This antiregional bias is especially strong among middle-class Londoners (as it also tends to be in New Yorkers and Parisians) who divide their country into the "metropolis" and the "provinces."

⁷Cyril Fox, *The Personality of Britain* (Cardiff, 1932); Joan Thirsk, "The Farming Regions of England and Wales," in Thirsk, ed., *The Agrarian History of England and Wales: IV, 1500–1640* (Cambridge, 1967), 1–112; John D. Gay, *The Geography of Religion in England* (London, 1971); R. T. Mason, *Framed Buildings of England* (Horsham, 1974); Eric Mercer, *English Vernacular Houses* (London, 1975).

⁸David Underdown, "The Chalk and the Cheese," *PP* 85 (1979), 129–54; Thirsk, "The Farming Regions of England and Wales," 1–112. Thirsk asks, "Was it generally true that pastoral regions were also the most fertile seedbeds for Puritanism and dissent?" In the 17th cen-

Principates refer to ancient sovereignties, which tend to be strong sources of regional identity throughout Europe. They are weaker in England where national unity came early, but the ancient kingdoms of East Anglia, Wessex, Mercia and Northumbria still survive as regional conceptions.

Counties are more than administrative units; many of England's collective memories are organized by counties. Its archives are lodged in county offices, its military traditions are kept by county regiments, its gentry were defined by county visitations, and its scholarship is written in county histories. County consciousness was even stronger in the past; one historian asserts that "when an Englishman of the early seventeenth century said, 'my country' he meant 'my county.'"⁹ Most regional taxonomies in English scholarship today are county-clusters.¹⁰

ture, antiquarians such as John Aubrey used soil types to explain differences in dialect in Wiltshire. "In North Wiltshire and the Vale of Gloucestershire (a dirty clayey country)," he wrote, "the Indigenae or Aborigines speak drawling. They are phlegmatique, skins pale and livid, slow and dull, heavy of spirit." *The Natural History of Wiltshire* (1862, rpt. New York, 1969), 11.


⁹Lawrence Stone, *The Causes of the English Revolution, 1529-1642* (New York, 1972), 106; Many historians have argued that the "county community" was the most important unit of identity in Civil War. The seminal work was done by A. M. Everitt, "The County Community," in E. W. Ives, ed., *The English Revolution, 1600-1660*, (London, 1968), 49; *idem*, *The Local Community in the English Civil War*, Historical Association Pamphlet G70 (1969); *idem*, *Change in the Provinces: The Seventeenth Century* (Leicester University Department of Local History, Occasional Papers, 2d ser., I, 1969).

Other "county community" studies include W. B. Willcox, *Gloucestershire, 1590-1640* (New Haven, 1940); Thomas Garden Barnes, *Somerset 1625-1640: A County's Government during the Personal Rule* (Cambridge, Mass., 1961); C. W. Chalkin, *Seventeenth Century Kent: A Social and Economic History* (London, 1965); Alan Everitt, *The Community of Kent and the Great Rebellion, 1640-1660* (Leicester, 1966); J. S. Morrill, *Cheshire 1630-1660: County Government and Society during the English Revolution* (Oxford, 1974); Anthony Fletcher, *Sussex 1600-1660: A County Community in Peace and War* (London, 1975); J. T. Cliffe, *The Yorkshire Gentry from the Reformation to the Civil War* (1969); B. G. Blackwood, *The Lancashire Gentry and the Great Rebellion, 1640-1660* (1978); Clive Holmes, *Seventeenth Century Lincolnshire* (Lincoln, 1980).

A second generation of studies, as yet unpublished but made available to the author in manuscript, tends to stress the permeability of county communities and the importance of connections that carried across county lines—thus opening a quasi-regional consciousness.

¹⁰In a pioneering regional history of England, series editors Barry Cunliffe and David Hey write, "English regional identities are imprecise, and no firm boundaries can be drawn . . . any attempt to define a region must be somewhat arbitrary, particularly in the midlands . . . yet regional differences are nonetheless real. . . . People still feel that they belong to a particular region within England as a whole." Their taxonomy uses the following county-clusters:

Northern Counties (Cumb., Dur., Nthumb., Tyne and Wear, N. Cleve.); *Lancashire/Cheshire* (Lancs., Ches., Mersey, Gr. Mancs.); *Yorkshire* (N., S., W. Yorks.; S. Cleve., N. Humberside); *West Midlands* (Salop, Staffs., W. Mid., Here. and Worcs., Warw., Glocs.); *East Midlands* (Derby, Notts., S. Humber, Lincs., Leics.); *South Midlands* (Northants., Oxon., Beds., Bucks., Herts., NW London); *Eastern Counties* (Norf., Suff., Essex., Cambs., NE London); *South West* (Devon., Cornwall); *Wessex* (Avon, Wilts., Berks., Hants., Dorset, Somerset); *South East* (Surrey, Kent, E. and W. Sussex, S. London); see Nick Higham, *The Northern Counties to AD 1000* (London, 1986), xv.



Provinces refer collectively to all of England except London, in a great disjunction between the metropolis and the rest of the nation. This idea is very strong in English scholarship today, but it is not very old—perhaps not older than the eighteenth century.¹¹ Nevertheless, many historians apply it to earlier periods.¹²

Hinterlands include both individual towns and the areas around them. This spatial unit is especially popular among English geographers, and has been highly developed in general studies of migration and trade.¹³

Other quasi-regional ideas include *river systems* which are ecological units of increasing conceptual prominence in England today; one thinks of the Thames Valley, the Severn Valley, Merseyside, Humberside and Tyneside. Also much in use is the idea of ecological *districts*, defined by their terrain, climate, flora and fauna—such as the Lake District, the Peak District, the Cotswolds, the Chilterns, the Yorkshire Dales, the Norfolk Broads, the Weald of Kent and Sussex, and various Moorlands and Downlands.

What, after all, is a region? For many scholars it is a physical entity formed by terrain, soil, climate, resources and systems of production. But these material models of English regions do not fit the facts of this inquiry. They do not coincide with patterns of emigration. Another approach to the problem works better. A region may also be thought of as a cultural phenomenon, created by a common customs and experiences. It might be defined primarily in historical terms, as a place in time whose people share a common heritage that sets them apart from others of their nation. A major conclusion of this work is that regions, so understood, have been more important in the history of Britain than they are in its historiography. But they have not always been the

¹¹“The earliest use so far discovered of the expression ‘the provinces’ to describe England outside London places it significantly in the context of the Industrial Revolution”; Donald Read, *The English Provinces, 1760–1790: A Study in Influence* (London, 1964), 2. The idea of “provinces” and “provincial” as a collective alternative to the metropolis was imported from France, and was rarely used as collective alternative to the metropolis before the mid-eighteenth century.

¹²John Morrill, *The Revolt of the Provinces: Conservatives and Radicals in the English Civil War, 1630–1650* (London, 1976, 1980). Both Morrill and Everitt use the idea of “provinces” and “provincialism” to mean local attachments of many kinds.

¹³General works include John Patten, *English Towns, 1500–1700* (Folkestone, Kent, 1978); Peter Clark and Paul Slack, *Crisis and Order in English Towns, 1500–1700* (London, 1972); *idem*, *English Towns in Transition, 1500–1700* (Oxford, 1976). Individual studies include Wallace T. MacCaffrey, *Exeter, 1540–1640* (2d ed., Cambridge, 1976); Roger Howell, *Newcastle-on-Tyne and the Puritan Revolution* (Oxford, 1967); and many other works.

same regions, nor have they always been important in the same way. Regional boundaries have changed with historical conditions.¹⁴

This inquiry was not about English regions in general, but historical regions that existed at a particular point in time, during the seventeenth and the early eighteenth century. They appear most clearly not in evidence collected after the industrial revolution, but in maps of cultural processes and political events through the preceding seven hundred years—in the jurisdiction of the Dane Law and the ancient boundaries of British kingdoms before King Edred; in the English earldoms of 1066 and the areas of support and opposition to King John in 1215; in the Peasants' Rebellion of 1381 and Jack Cade's Revolt in 1450; in the distribution of Marian martyrs in the sixteenth century and the incidence of Elizabethan Puritanism; in the areas that rallied to Parliament and to the Crown in the seventeenth century; and not least in patterns of emigration to the American colonies.

All of this evidence shows strong and consistent regional patterns that do not conform to the boundaries of topographical zones, soil types, field systems, farming regimes, hinterlands, river systems or ecological districts. The regions of seventeenth-century England were defined primarily by broad ethnic, cultural and historical processes.¹⁵

Four historical regions in seventeenth-century Britain were specially important to this inquiry. The first of them lay in the east of England, and included the three peninsulae of East Anglia itself, eastern Lincolnshire and the northeastern fringe of Kent. The boundary of this territory ran through the old counties of Rutland, Huntingdon and Hertford. In the seventeenth century, this area was commonly called the "East" or "eastern England." With the addition of Kent it corresponded roughly to the area of the "Eastern Association" which supported Parliament in the

¹⁴An example is the changing role of communications in defining regional identities. In the early 17th century, water was a medium more permeable than land. Areas which are now held apart by the arms of the sea were joined together in close embrace. East Lincolnshire, East Anglia and East Kent, for example, were united by the North Sea. In the same way, English Cumbria, Scottish Galloway and the Irish provinces of Antrim and Down were all linked by the Irish Sea. In these terms, British regions in the 17th century were not the same as those we know today. The idea of "permeability" comes from R. R. Palmer and Jacques Godechot, "Le problème de l'Atlantique du XVIIe au XXe siècle," *Relazioni del X Congresso Internazionale di Scienze Storiche* (Rome, 1955), 5, 175–239; for a similar argument as regards the Irish Sea, see Innes Macleod, *Discovering Galloway* (Edinburgh, 1986), 5.

¹⁵These maps appear below.

English Civil War. This region produced approximately 60 percent of emigrants to Massachusetts.¹⁶

A second historical region, which sent many sons to Virginia, was a broad belt of territory through the south of England, extending from Kent to Devon, and north as far as Warwick. It encompassed the ancient kingdom of Wessex and its Mercian protectorates—the realm of Alfred and Aethelred. This area had the least articulated sense of regional identity because it believed itself to be the heartland of the country—in Henry James's phrase, "midmost England, unmitigated England." Nevertheless, it had a cultural existence which was defined by its history, in ways that made it distinct from East Anglia, the North Country and the Celtic cultures of Wales and Cornwall to the west. Roughly 60 percent of Virginia gentlemen and servants came from this region.¹⁷

A third historical region lay in the North Midlands of England. It included a broad belt of territory from Cheshire and Derbyshire north through Lancashire and the West Riding of Yorkshire to southern Cumbria. This area was called "the North Country" in the seventeenth century. Thus a Quaker named John Crock wrote, "I was born in the North Country." Another wrote that "he heard of a people in the North of England, who preferred the light. . . ." And a third described Quakerism as "glad tidings brought out of the north." This area was the source of approximately 60 percent of the Quaker population which settled in the Delaware Valley.¹⁸

The fourth historical region was an area which included the English counties of Westmorland, Cumberland, Northumberland, Durham, and the North Riding of Yorkshire, together with the southern counties of Scotland. As early as the fifteenth century this region was called the "border," or "borders," and its inhabitants called themselves "borderers."¹⁹ These people of Scotland and northern England, together with their transplanted cousins in Ulster, were very mixed in their ethnicity, but they

¹⁶Clive Holmes, *The English Association in the English Civil War* (Cambridge, 1974).

¹⁷Henry James, *English Hours* (1905, rpt. New York, 1960), 724; James Bishop, ed., *The Illustrated Counties of England* (London, n.d.), 124; evidence of this region appears in part 2, below.

¹⁸John Crock, "Memoirs"; Charles Marshall, "Journal . . ."; and Edmund Chester, "Narrative," in William and Thomas Evans, eds., *Friends' Library* (14 vols., Philadelphia, 1837–50), XIII, 207; IV, 123; III, 71.

¹⁹*OED*, s.v. "Border," 3.a; "Borderer," 1.

shared a common culture which was shaped by the history of their region. More than 60 percent of settlers in the American backcountry were immigrants or the children of immigrants from northern Ireland, the lowlands of Scotland, and the six northern counties of England.

The origin of regional differences between East Anglia, southwestern England, the North Country and the borderlands is a problem that carries far beyond the subject of this book. A search for their beginning leads back a thousand years before American history to ethnic movements as early as the seventh century—and even that date is not early enough to mark the beginning of differences between these cultural regions in the east and south and north of England, which had important consequences for American history.

☛ British Origins: The Religious Factor

Of all the determinants which shaped the cultural character of British America, the most powerful was religion. During the seventeenth century, the English-speaking people were deeply divided by the great questions of the Protestant Reformation. These divisions in turn created a broad spectrum of English denominations in the New World.

The “right wing” of the British Reformation was the party of Anglican Episcopacy which favored an inclusive national church, a hierarchy of priests, compulsory church taxes and a union of church and crown. Its worship centered on liturgy and ritual, its theology became increasingly Arminian in the seventeenth century, and its creed was defined by the Book of Common Prayer. This denomination was specially strong in the south and west of England. It was destined to dominate Virginia for more than a century.

Next to the Episcopalians on Britain’s spectrum of religious belief were Presbyterians. They also favored a broad national church, but one which was ruled by strong synods of ministers and elders rather than by bishops and priests. The theology of Presbyterianism was Calvinist; its worship centered on preaching and conversion. The Presbyterians were numerous in North Britain, where they made much use of evangelical field meetings and prayer meetings. They became very strong in the American backcountry.

Near the center were Congregationalists, who defined their position as the “middle way.” Their church government was a mixed confederacy of independent congregations and weak synods. Their theology took a middle ground between Arminianism (which tended toward rationalism and free will) and Antinomianism (the dominion of the spirit). Their formal beliefs were defined by the Synod of Dort (1618–19) in the five points of Calvinism (total depravity, limited atonement, unconditional election, irresistible grace and the final perseverance of the saints)—a Christian creed of extreme austerity. This group was strong in the eastern counties of England. It founded the colonies of Massachusetts and Connecticut.

To the left of the Congregationalists were the Separatists, who believed in the autonomy of each congregation, and wished to separate themselves from the corruption of an unreformed national church. Their theology was broadly Calvinist, and their classical text was Robert Browne’s *Reformation without Tarrying for Any* (1583). This denomination included the *Mayflower* Pilgrims who founded Plymouth Colony.

Farther left were various sects of Anabaptists, many of whom subscribed to the five points of Calvinism, but added a “sixth principle” that baptism should be restricted to regenerate Christians. Their theology stressed the working of the Holy Spirit more than the teaching of divine law. Their church was a fellowship in which worship was a sharing of the spirit of Grace. Most Baptists also believed in the separation of church and state, primarily to preserve the church from spiritual pollution. They founded the colony of Rhode Island.

Beyond the Baptists were the Quakers, who believed that Jesus died not merely for a chosen few but for everyone, and that a Holy Spirit called the Inner Light dwelled within all people. Their beliefs rose from the teachings of George Fox and received their classic statement in Robert Barclay’s *Apology for the True Christian Religion*. Quakers rejected the legitimacy of established churches, ordained clergy and formal liturgy. Their meetings for worship centered upon the movement of the spirit. This denomination first appeared in the North Midlands of England. It founded the colonies of West Jersey, Pennsylvania and Delaware.

Because religion touched so many parts of life in the era of the reformation, these denominational divisions created deep cultural differences which have survived in American regions long after their original purposes have been lost.

British Protestantism in the Seventeenth Century: The Spectrum of Practice and Belief

<i>Denomination</i>	<i>Quakers</i>	<i>Baptists</i>	<i>Separatists</i>	<i>Congregationalists</i>	<i>Presbyterians</i>	<i>Anglicans</i>
Ecclesiology	Hierarchy of Meetings	Small Sects and Fellowships	Separate Congregations	Weak Synods Strong Congregations	Strong Synods	Episcopal
Polity	Consensual	Communal	Democratic	Mixed	Oligarchic	Monarchic
Sect-Church typology	Sect-type	Sect-type	Sect-type	Mixed	Church-type	Church-type
Forms of worship	Spirit-centered	Fellowship-centered	Sermon-centered	Sermon-centered	Sermon-centered	Liturgy centered
Church state Relations	Extreme Separation	Extreme Separation	Moderate Separation	Moderate Separation	Moderate Union	Strong Union
Theology	Inner Light	Six Points and Mixed	Five Points of Calvinism	Five Points of Calvinism	Five Points of Calvinism	Arminian and Mixed
Creed	None	Many	Browne's Booke	Cambridge Platform	Westminster Confession	Book of Common Prayer
Texts	Barclay's <i>Apology</i>	Many	Brown's <i>Reformation without Tarrying</i>	Ames's <i>Marrow of Sacred Divinity</i>	Knox's <i>Discipline</i>	Hooker's <i>Laws of Ecclesiastical Polity</i>
Colonies	West Jersey Pennsylvania	Rhode Island	Plymouth	Massachusetts Connecticut	Backcountry	Virginia
Leaders	William Penn	Roger Williams	William Bradford	John Winthrop	Francis Makemie	William Berkeley

British Origins: The Factor of Social Rank

Another determinant of cultural differences in British America was the social rank of the colonists. This factor worked in two ways. First, the founders of America's various regional cultures came from different strata of British society. Second, major changes occurred in England's ranking system during the era of colonization. Emigrants in the early seventeenth century had one way of thinking about social status; those who arrived in the mid-eighteenth century had another. This process of change added another dimension to regional differences in America.

To understand this problem we must study the ranking systems of earlier periods in their own terms. Between 1577 and 1600, this subject was discussed by three English writers: Thomas Smith (1583), William Harrison (1587), and Thomas Wilson (1600).²⁰ None of these authors thought in terms of modern social classes, or even used the word "class." Sir Thomas Wilson wrote of "estates"; Harrison, of "conditions" and "degrees"; Smith, of "orders." These categories were defined not by material possessions or by the means of production, but by access to power. In Smith's phrase they were "orders of authority . . . annexed to the blood and progeny."²¹

The three authors agreed in their description of the upper orders. At the top of every list came the King himself, who was quaintly called the "first gentleman" or "chief gentleman" of England. Then came the princes and the "*nobilitas major*," an order so small in England that Harrison could list every member on a single page: he counted one marquis, twenty earls, two viscounts and forty-one barons, plus twenty-four bishops who were the "lords spiritual" of England. Smith's list in 1600 was even smaller—sixty-one noblemen altogether. This was England's high aristocracy; it contributed much to the capitalization of British America but little to its population.²²

Next came the *nobilitas minor*, who were identified as knights,

²⁰Sir Thomas Smith, *De Republica Anglorum* (1583), ed. Mary Dewar (Cambridge, 1982); William Harrison, *The Description of England* (1587), ed. Georges Edelen (Ithaca, 1968); Sir Thomas Wilson, "The State of England, 1600," ed. F. J. Fisher, *CS* 3d ser. 52 (1936), 18–25. Some parts of Harrison's account (which appeared earlier in another form) were copied by Smith; parts of Smith and Harrison were borrowed by Wilson. Each author added many passages of his own invention.

²¹Smith, *De Republica Anglorum*, 64, 76.

²²*Ibid.*, 20.

esquires, and gentlemen. Wilson reckoned that there were about 500 knights and 16,000 esquires whom he defined as "gentlemen whose ancestors are or were knights, or else they are the heirs and eldest of their houses and of some competent quantity of revenue." This order or estate also included a residue of undifferentiated gentlemen who were defined in different ways. Smith identified them as "those whom their blood and race doth make noble and known," or "whose ancestor hath been notable in riches or for his virtues, or (in fewer words) old riches."²³ Wilson, on the other hand, defined them in an interesting way as "younger brothers," and added:

their state is of all stations for gentlemen the most miserable, for . . . my elder brother forsooth must be my master. . . . This I must confess doth us good someways, for it makes us industrious to apply ourselves to letters or to arms, whereby many times we become my master elder-brothers' masters, at least their betters in honour and reputation, while he lives at home like a mome [a fool].²⁴

This group, particularly the younger sons, played an important role in the creation of a Virginia elite.

Beneath the rank of gentlemen were clergy, lawyers and learned professions. There was general agreement that professional men were "made good cheape in England," and had become too numerous for the good of the realm. Below the professions, all writers recognized an estate of "citizens" who had been admitted to the liberties of England's towns and boroughs—"a commonwealth among themselves," Wilson wrote.²⁵

Next came the yeomanry. Wilson divided this rank into "great yeomanry" (10,000 strong), whom he thought much "decayed," but often with estates larger than "some covetous mongrel gentleman." Below them came "yeomen of meaner ability which are called freeholders," whom he reckoned to have been 80,000 strong, after having studied the sheriffs' books in which they were listed.²⁶ Smith noted that the rank of yeoman, though mainly defined by possession of a freehold, also implied a certain age. "Commonly, he wrote, "we do not call any a yeoman till he be married, and have children, and as it were have some authority

²³ *Ibid.*, 70.

²⁴ Wilson, "The State of England."

²⁵ Smith, *De Republica Anglorum*, 72.

²⁶ Wilson, "The State of England."

among his neighbours. . .”²⁷ Harrison wrote that “this sort of people have a certain pre-eminence . . . live wealthily, keep good houses and travail [work] to get riches.” This rank, with lawyers, clergy and citizens, was important in the formation of New England’s elite.²⁸

Below the rank of yeoman, all of these lists became very thin as they reached the “lower orders” who included the great majority of England’s population. Wilson’s taxonomy ended in a single broad category which embraced “copyholders who hold some land and tenements of some other lord,” and “cottagers,” who “live chiefly upon country labour, working by the day for meat and drink and some small wages.” He noted that “the number of this latter sort is uncertain because there is no books or records kept of them.” Smith also had a catch-all category at the bottom for “day laborers, poor husbandmen, merchants or retailers which have no free land, copyholders, all artificers.” To a modern mind this lower order seems a very mixed group, but all shared a quality in common. Smith called them “men which do not rule.” Harrison explained, “These have no voice or authority in our common wealth, and no account is made of them but only to be ruled.”²⁹

This was England’s system of social rank at the beginning of the seventeenth century—a complex set of orders, degrees, estates or conditions which were more rigid than modern classes. It was a way of thinking that persisted through the period of the English Civil War. The poll tax of 1660, for example, recognized the same taxonomy.

By the late seventeenth century, however, new ideas of social rank were stirring in England. A case in point was a famous analysis of English society by Gregory King. At first sight, his list of “ranks, degrees, orders and qualifications” seemed similar to those of Harrison, Smith and Wilson nearly 100 years earlier. But on closer examination, important differences appeared. King’s social orders were less distinct than those a century earlier. Between the *nobilitas major* and *nobilitas minor*, the rank of baronet had been introduced as a fund-raising device by cash-poor Stuart kings. The professions had grown more numerous and

²⁷Smith, *De Republica Anglorum*, 76.

²⁸Harrison, *Description of England*, 117.

²⁹Smith, *De Republica Anglorum*, 64, 76; Harrison wrote that they “have neither voice nor authority in the commonwealth, but are to be ruled and not to rule other.” *Description of England*, 118.

Three Taxonomies of Social Rank in England, 1577–1600

I. Harrison, 1577

"Of Degrees of People in the Commonwealth of England"

Gentlemen of the Greater Sort

The King "first gentleman"
Princes
Dukes
Marquises
Earls
Viscounts
Barons
Bishops

Gentlemen of the Lesser Sort

Knights
Esquires
Gentlemen

Citizens or Burgesses

Officers
Merchants

Yeomen

Farmers
Artificers

Labourers

Day labourers
Poor Husbandmen
Retailers

Meaner Artificers

Idle Servingmen

Beggars

II. Smith, 1583

"Of the Parties of the Commonwealth of England"

Nobilitas Major

The King "chiefe gentleman"
Princes

Marquises
Earls
Viscounts
Barons

Nobilitas Minor

Knights
Squires
Simple Gentlemen

Citizens and Burgesses

Yeomen

Men Which Do Not Rule

Day labourers
Poor Husbandmen
Merchants or retailers that have no free land
Copiholders
All Artificers, as Taylors, Shoemakers,
Carpenters, Brickmakers, Bricklayers,
Masons, &c

III. Wilson, 1600

"The Ability and State of . . . the People of England"

Nobilitas Major

King
Princes

Marquises
Earls
Viscounts
Barons
Bishops

Nobilitas Minor

Knights
Esquires (elder brothers)
Gentlemen (younger brothers)

Professors

Ministers, Archdeacons

Prebends and Vicars

Lawyers

Citizens
Aldermen and Burgesses
Great Merchants
Meaner Merchants

Yeomanry

Great Yeomen
Meaner Yeomen or Freeholders

Copyholders and Cottagers

more complex, and two new ranks were added for "persons in office." Merchants had advanced from the bottom to near the top—above even the clergy. The lower ranks had become elaborately subdivided by occupation.³⁰

In the early eighteenth century, this new way of thinking about stratification began to develop rapidly. Rank was defined increasingly not by origins, but by possessions. One finds this new ranking system in the writings of Daniel Defoe, who used the word "class" in its modern sense as early as the year 1705.³¹ In 1709, Defoe described English society as follows:

1. The great, who live profusely.
2. The rich, who live very plentifully.
3. The middle sort, who live well.
4. The working trades, who labour hard, but feel no want.
5. The country people, farmers, &c., who fare indifferently.
6. The poor, that fare hard.
7. The miserable, that really pinch and suffer want.³²

Here was a modern class model in which people were assigned a place according to their material possessions. Thereafter, this idea developed steadily through the eighteenth century. Raymond Williams writes that the "development of *class* in its modern social sense, with relatively fixed names for particular classes (lower class, middle class, upper class, working class) belongs essentially to the period between 1770 and 1840."³³

This transformation had important consequences for American history. The four waves of British emigrants came not only from different ranks, but also from different periods in the history of ranking systems. The older system of orders came to Massachusetts where it survived in a truncated form, and also to Virginia where it was extended by the development of servitude and slavery. But the founders of the Quaker colonies and especially the back settlements came from a later era in which orders and estates were yielding to social classes. This fact made a difference in the development of regional cultures throughout British America.

³⁰This question is separate from that of the accuracy of King's estimates. It is thought by some historians that King undercounted the upper ranks and underestimated incomes of those at the bottom. See G. S. Holmes, "Gregory King and the Social Structure of Pre-Industrial England," *RHST* (1977).

³¹Daniel Defoe, *Review*, 14 April 1705.

³²*Ibid.*, 25 June 1709, quoted in Dorothy George, *London Life in the Eighteenth Century* (New York, 1965), 370n.

³³Raymond Williams, *Keywords: A Vocabulary of Culture and Society* (New York, 1976), 51.

British Origins: The Factor of Generations

The four migrations came not only from different regions, ranks and religions, but also from different generations. The key concept here is that of an *historical* generation—not a demographic cohort but a cultural group whose identity is formed by great events. In the turbulence of the twentieth century, for example, everyone recognizes the “generation of the Great Depression,” the “generation of World War II,” and the “generation of the ’60s.” Seventeenth-century England had similar historical generations, which were defined by the same events that set the major folk migrations in motion.

Each of these migrations created a culture which preserved something of the moment when it was born. The Puritans settled Massachusetts within a period of eleven years from 1629 to 1640—an epoch in English history which is remembered by Whig historians as the “eleven years’ tyranny.” This was the time when Charles I tried to rule without a Parliament and Archbishop William Laud attempted to purge the Anglican Church of Puritans. The great constitutional and religious issues of this epoch were carried to the Puritan colonies and became central to the culture of New England—persisting as intellectual obsessions long after they had been forgotten in the mother country.

A large part of Virginia’s migration of cavaliers and indentured servants occurred between 1649 and 1660, an unstable era of English history called the interregnum. In this period of disorder the dominant elite was an oligarchy of English Puritans, and their victims included a group of defeated Royalists, some of whom carried to Virginia a culture which was defined not merely by their rank and party but also by their generation—in its fascination with constitutional questions, its obsession with honor, and its contempt for the arts of peace. The culture of America’s tide-water south was to retain these characteristics long after England had moved beyond them.

The Friends’ migration to the Delaware Valley happened mainly in the years from 1675 to 1689. This was part of an historical epoch which began with the Restoration, and continued through the reigns of Charles II (1660–85) and his Catholic brother James II (1685–88). In this period of English history, the great questions were about how people of different beliefs could live in peace together. That question was central to the cultural history of the Delaware colonies, and remained so for many years.

Another period of English history followed the Glorious Rev-

A Short Chronology of Anglo-American History, 1558–1760

<i>Reign</i>	<i>Events in Britain</i>	<i>Events in America</i>
Elizabeth I (1558–1603)		1583 Gilbert in Newfoundland
		1584–87 Raleigh founds Roanoke
	1587 War with Spain; colonization ceases	1590 Roanoke found abandoned
James I (1603–25)	1604 Spanish War ends; colonization revives	
	1606 Virginia Companies of Plymouth and London	
		1607 Jamestown founded Sagadahoc founded
		1620 Plymouth founded
Charles I (1625–49)	1629–40 Eleven Years' Tyranny	1630–41 Puritan Great Migration
	Charles rules without Parliaments	1630 Massachusetts founded
	1633–40 Archbishop Laud purges Puritans from Church of England	1634 Laud's Commission on Plantation
		1634 Maryland founded
		1636 Connecticut and Rhode Island founded
		1638 New Haven founded
	1640 Parliament called Laud impeached and later executed	
1642–47 First Civil War	1642 Sir Wm. Berkeley to Virginia	
1649 Charles I executed		
Interregnum	1649–60 England Becomes a Commonwealth	1649–65 Royalist Migration to Virginia
	1653 Oliver Cromwell becomes Protector	1655 Protectorate seeks to curb colonial autonomy
	1658 Richard Cromwell succeeds father Protectorate disintegrates	
Charles II (1660–85)	1660 Restoration of Charles II Declaration of Breda promises Religious liberty to all Christians	
	1661–65 Clarendon Code penalizes Dissenters and Quakers in particular	1663 Carolina granted to eight Royalists
	1665–67 Anglo-Dutch War	1664 New Netherland granted Duke of York
	1672 Declaration of Indulgence suspends Penal laws against dissenters	
	1673 Test Act; Tithe Persecution of Quakers Continues	1675–95 Friends' Migration to West Jersey and Pa.
James II (1685–88)	1685 King seeks repeal of Test Act and is defeated; prorogues Parliament	1685 James creates Dominion for New Eng. to curb colonies
	1688 Glorious Revolution;	1688–89 Revolutions in colonies
Wm. & Mary (1689–1702)	1689 Declaration of Rights	
	1701 Act of Settlement defines descent	1696 Board of Trade founded
Anne (1702–14)	1702–13 War of Spanish Succession	1702–13 Queen Anne's War
	1707 Union of England and Scotland	1715–75 North Britons Move to Backcountry
George I (1714–27)	1715 The '15 Rebellion in Scotland	
	1721 Walpole's ministry	
George II (1727–60)		1729 NC and SC royal colonies
	1745 The '45 Rebellion in Scotland	1733 Georgia founded

olution of 1688, when a pattern of political stability formed “as suddenly as water becomes ice,” in historian J. H. Plumb’s words.³⁴ The government of England passed firmly into the hands of an oligarchy of country gentlemen. This solution created new problems which concerned the relationship between England’s governing elite and others—in particular, the people of Ireland, Scotland, America, the London mob and the rural poor. Violent conflicts set in motion yet another wave of emigration which brought to America the great question of whether the rights of English gentlemen belonged to other people. These issues took root in the American interior, where they survive even to our own time. All four folk cultures of Anglo-America preserved the dominant themes in English history during the years when they began.

American Development: The Environment

British culture was not the only determinant of regional differences. The American environment also played an important role—not by “breaking down” or “dissolving” European culture (as the frontier thesis suggested) but by more complex material pressures which modified European cultures in some respects and reinforced them in others.

In New England, the Puritans selected a rigorous environment which was well suited to their purposes. The climate (colder and more changeable than today) proved exceptionally healthy to Europeans, but high mortality among African immigrants reinforced a Puritan ambivalence toward the growth of slavery. The configuration of New England’s coastline and the distribution of soil resources in small pockets of alluvial fertility encouraged town settlement. The Indians of Massachusetts Bay had been nearly destroyed by disease before the Puritans arrived; conflicts remained at a comparatively low level for nearly fifty years except during the Pequot War.

The Virginians encountered a very different environment. The Chesapeake Bay, with its 6,500 miles of tidal shoreline, its hundreds of rivers and creeks, and its abundance of good soil, encouraged scattered settlement and plantation agriculture. The climate (about the same as today) produced bountiful staple crops. But the Chesapeake estuary was unhealthy, and European

³⁴J. H. Plumb, *The Growth of Political Stability in England, 1675–1725* (London, 1967), 13.

death rates were twice as high as in New England. Africans had lower mortality rates than in the northern colonies, and slavery developed rapidly from the late seventeenth century. The large Indian population of the Powhatan Confederacy strongly resisted English settlement, with much bloody fighting.

The Delaware Valley offered yet a third set of environmental conditions. This area proved more salubrious than the Chesapeake, but less so than Massachusetts. Its climate was mild and its soil endowment was the richest of the eastern colonies, producing crop yields above all other coastal regions for three centuries. An abundance of mineral resources and a fall line only a few miles from the sea supported rapid industrial development. The Delaware Indians were not warlike in the early years of settlement. Altogether this environment was perfectly suited to the purposes of the Quakers, as they well knew when they chose to settle there.

Regional Cultures of Anglo-America: Environmental Conditions

<i>Hearth Area</i>	<i>Massachusetts</i>	<i>Virginia</i>	<i>Delaware Valley</i>	<i>Backcountry</i>
<i>Temperature (1950-1980)</i>				
January mean	25°F	40°F	31°F	37°F
January average low	18°F	32°F	24°F	30°F
<i>Temperature (1950-1980)</i>				
July mean	72°F	78°F	76°F	77°F
July average high	82°F	88°F	86°F	87°F
<i>Temperature (18th Century)</i>				
Coastal sea surface deviation from 20th-century norms				
January mean	-5.4°F	0	-1.8°F	n.a.
July mean	-3.6°F	0	-1.8°F	n.a.
<i>Precipitation (1950-1980)</i>				
Annual inches	40	45	42	48
Annual wet days	118	113	116	120
Percent daily sunshine	57%	62%	58%	61%
Snow, annual inches	55	8	21	15
<i>Water Access</i>				
Sources	Riverine	Estuarine	Riverine	Springs
Bay areas (sq. mi.)	959	3,237	665	0
Tidal shoreline (mi.)	2,484	6,505	1,512	0
<i>Salubrity (ca. 1700)</i>				
Death rate, whites	25	50	37	35
Death rate, blacks	65	50	n.a.	n.a.
Dying time, whites	Aug.-Oct.	June-Oct.	July-Oct.	July-Oct.
Dying time, blacks	Jan.-May	May-Sep.	n.a.	n.a.
<i>Woodlands</i>				
Forest types	Boreal to temperate	Temperate to subtropical	Temperate	Mixed by elevation
Growing season	150 days	210 days	180 days	180 days

For many years it supported their “holy experiment” in prosperity and peace.

The southern backcountry was a densely forested highland region of enormous proportions. Markets were distant and travel difficult, but the abundance of land and water encouraged the rapid growth of family farming and herding. The climate was comparatively mild and healthy. The Indians were numerous and very hostile to European settlement. The backcountry became a cockpit of international rivalry, and was ravaged by major wars in every generation from 1689 to 1815. The climate, resources and dangers of this American environment were well matched to the culture of the British borderlands.

American Development: The Indians

In every region, English colonists met an indigenous population of American Indians. The collision of these groups was a cultural process of high complexity, which can only be discussed here in a summary way. In brief, the Indian populations of North America were not a cultural monolith. Even within the eastern woodlands, the Indians of New England, the Delaware Valley, the Chesapeake Bay and the Appalachian highlands were at least as diverse in their folk customs as were the British themselves—in many ways, much more so. Moreover, the demography of these various Indian populations also tended to be very different from one to another. Further, Indian cultures were changing through time. Each had its own history, which scholars are only beginning to reconstruct.

The founders of the British colonies were aware of this diversity, and deliberately selected the sites of their own settlements in part because of the special character of the Indians in the vicinity. This was very much the case among New England Puritans and Delaware Quakers. All four major British groups also invented their own distinctive policies toward the Indians. They tended to treat the Indians in profoundly different ways, and were treated differently in their turn.

The results were distinct regional processes of interaction, involving at least four causal variables: Indian culture, Indian demography, white culture and white demography. A result was that relations between Indians and Europeans reinforced regional differences in a complex web of cause and consequence.

The larger outlines of this process have never been described comprehensively, though various monographic findings are beginning to come in. The author has been collecting his thoughts and materials on this subject for many years and hopes to find an opportunity to set them forward in more detail than is possible here.

☛ American Development: Imperial Politics

The growth of regional folk cultures in British America was also fostered by a unique political environment which was very different from other European colonies. New France and New Spain were more closely controlled by imperial authorities than were England's American provinces, which had more freedom to manage their own affairs.

This condition did not develop by design. English statesmen looked upon the empires of France and Spain with admiration, and even with envy. The authorities in London often tried to impose similar controls upon their own colonies. But for many years these efforts failed and regional cultures of British America were left to go their own way. The first important English attempt to control the American colonies was made by Charles I, who created a Commission for Foreign Plantations in 1634. Its head was Archbishop William Laud, the great Anglican enemy of Puritanism, whose assignment was to curb New England's independence. For that purpose, a "great ship" was ordered in England, while the people of Massachusetts made ready to defend themselves. But before the great ship sailed, Parliament rose against Charles I and one of its first acts was to execute Archbishop Laud. New England continued to govern itself for many years.

During the Civil War, King and Parliament both claimed the right to regulate the colonies, but neither was able to do so. A Parliamentary Commission for Plantations was appointed in 1643, but before it began to act effectively, Parliament itself was overthrown by Oliver Cromwell. The colonies continued to go their own way.

After 1653 the Protectorate also tried to organize the colonies into a coherent imperial system. To that end, Oliver Cromwell and his Protector's Council created two new bodies—a Committee for Foreign Plantations (1655), and a Committee for America (1656). An expedition was sent against the Royalist regime in Vir-

ginia, but after Cromwell's early death in 1658, these bodies also disbanded. The colonies continued to control their own affairs.

The restoration of Charles II in 1660 was followed by a more sustained effort to create an imperial system—this time through the Privy Council's Committee for Trade and Plantations, called the Lords of Trade (1660). Various other councils and committees also functioned in a fitful way from 1660 to 1685, but none gained effective control over the colonies. The fragility of England's restored monarchy, the poverty of the new regime, and the caution of the King himself all prevented strong measures, except in Virginia after Bacon's Rebellion. The colonies retained much of their independence.¹

After the year 1685, England's King James II tried to impose a consolidated government called the Dominion of New England upon all the colonies from Maine to Delaware. He appointed a viceregal figure named Sir Edmund Andros to govern it. The result was an American Revolution of 1688 which began before the accession of William and Mary, and ended with Sir Edmund Andros a prisoner in Boston. The colonies narrowly survived yet another imperial challenge.²

After the Glorious Revolution, the new Protestant regime of William and Mary also tried to bring the colonies to heel, and at last succeeded in doing so. It created a new body called the Board of Trade, and a complex machinery of imperial government. But the delicate relationship between King and Parliament prevented either from asserting itself as forcefully as did imperial authorities in France and Spain. After 1714, Britain was ruled by German kings who cared little about America, and English ministers who knew less. One of them believed that Massachusetts was an island. There was in London a profound ignorance of American conditions.

Throughout the empire, colonial assemblies continued to claim parliamentary status, even though officials in London regarded them as comparable to municipal councils. This constitutional

¹The Lords of Trade might be thought of as a transitional institution, which began to assert effective control over the American colonies; see Winfred T. Root, "Lords of Trade and Plantations, 1675-1696," *American Historical Review* 23 (1917), 20. A strong case has recently been made for the mid-1670s as the pivot point, rather than the 1680s or 1690s. See Stephen S. Webb, *1676: The End of American Independence* (New York, 1984).

²The revolution began in Boston on 19 April 1689, after news that William had landed in England, but before the outcome was known. See David S. Lovejoy, *The Glorious Revolution in America* (New York, 1972).

question was not resolved before 1775. While it continued, England's American provinces remained more nearly autonomous than other European colonies, and regional cultures developed with less interference from above.

☛ American Development: Immigration and Race

British America also differed from other empires in another way. It was settled mainly by voluntary migration. Most British men and women made their own way to the New World. Many raised the price of their own passage, and freely chose to settle in a colony which was congenial to their culture. This pattern changed in the eighteenth century when large numbers of involuntary immigrants appeared: transported felons, soldiers under orders, and more than 250,000 African slaves. But even when this traffic was at its peak, most people came to America as volunteers.³

This voluntary migration was unique to the British colonies. In New France, a large part of the population was descended from conscripts, soldiers, sailors, basket women, "king's girls," civil servants, priests and nuns, and others who had been ordered to America, sometimes much against their will.⁴ Once arrived, these immigrants tended to be more closely controlled, except on the fringes of the colony. In Quebec, a secret organization of females called the Congregation of the Holy Family kept watch by a system of domestic espionage which had no counterpart in the English colonies.⁵ In New Spain, colonists were screened for religious and social orthodoxy, and kept under continuing surveillance by imperial authorities. The Spanish Inquisition became more active in Mexico than it had been in Iberia. Its worst excesses of cruelty and persecution were committed in the New World.⁶

³A subsequent volume in this series will examine this question.

⁴The "king's girls" were collected from orphanages, alms-houses and various other places, and sent by the shipload to Quebec. More than 1,000 arrived in the eight years from 1665 to 1673.

⁵Francis Parkman turned up the manuscript sources and reported them in *The Old Regime in Canada* (Cambridge, 1974), 418.

⁶The leading works are still those of José Toribio Medina, *Historia del tribunal del Santo oficio* . . . (6 vols., Santiago, 1887–1905), and Henry C. Lea, *The Inquisition in the Spanish Dependencies* . . . (New York, 1908); see also Cecil Roth, *The Spanish Inquisition* (1937, London, 1964), 208–26; Richard E. Greenleaf, *Zumárraga and the Mexican Inquisition, 1536–1543* (Washington, 1961).

British America's voluntary migration encouraged religious diversity rather than uniformity. It also allowed like-minded colonists of various sects to settle together and to transplant their own folkways to the New World.

Immigration also promoted regional development in another way. For many years, the American colonies effectively became their own gatekeepers. They were able to control the process of immigration themselves, and did so in very different ways.

The Puritan colonies stubbornly enforced a policy of strict exclusion despite imperial opposition. The homogeneity of New England's population was not an historical accident; it arose from the religious purposes and social values of a regional culture.

The founders of Pennsylvania had very different ideas about immigration. William Penn and the Quaker elite of the colony made a special effort to attract European Protestants whose values were compatible with their own. English Quakers, German Pietists and Swiss Anabaptists all believed deeply in the doctrine of the inner light, religious freedom, the ethic of work and the evil of violence. The immigration policy of the Quakers expanded the community of Christian values beyond the boundaries of their own sect, and deliberately encouraged a diversity of national stocks in the Delaware Valley.

The rulers of Virginia adopted still a third immigration policy. Puritans and Quakers were not welcome; many were banished or driven out. But the Virginians actively recruited a servile underclass to support their manorial ideal, first by bringing in large numbers of English servants, and then by importing African slaves. Their object was not merely to solve a problem of labor scarcity (which might have been done in many other ways) but to do so in a manner consistent with their hierarchical values.

The backsettlers were not able to control immigration to the southern highlands in any formal way. But local neighborhoods had other methods of deciding who would go or stay. The old folk custom of "hating out" was used when necessary. The prevailing cultural climate also had a similar effect; in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century, for example, Quakers and Congregationalists left the southern backcountry, moving north to a more congenial cultural environment.

Local control of immigration thus tended to reinforce cultural differences between regions. Even as most parts of British America became more diverse during the eighteenth century, they did so in very different ways, according to purposes and values of their founders.

One effect of immigration was to change the racial composition of the four major regions of British America. African slaves were imported to every colony, but in very different proportions. In many parts of New England blacks were never more than 1 per cent of the population before 1760; in some southern coastal counties, blacks were more than a majority by that date.

To understand the relationship between race and regional culture in British America, one must study carefully the timing and sequence of historical change. An important and neglected fact about race slavery in British America is that it developed very slowly. Africans did not begin to arrive in large numbers until the late seventeenth century. The presence of blacks did not begin to have a major cultural impact on British America until the late seventeenth and early eighteenth century. Then, the impact was profound. The problem of race relations moved rapidly to the center of cultural history in the plantation colonies. African folkways also began to transform the language and culture of Europeans, and the "peculiar institution" of slavery created new folkways of its own.

These great and complex processes will be studied in the second volume of this work, "American Plantations." In this first volume, the major conclusion is that race slavery did not create the culture of the southern colonies; that culture created slavery.

☛ The Expansion of Four Regional Cultures

By the year 1770 the four folk cultures had taken firm root in British America. All expanded rapidly. Emigrants from Massachusetts founded colonies with similar cultures in Connecticut, New Hampshire, southern Maine, eastern Vermont, Long Island, East Jersey, upstate New York and northern Ohio. The culture of tidewater Virginia expanded into southern Maryland, southern Delaware, coastal North Carolina and west beyond the mountains to parts of Kentucky. The folkways of the Delaware Valley spread through West Jersey, eastern Pennsylvania, parts of northeastern Maryland and central Ohio. After 1740 the borderers of North Britain rapidly occupied the Appalachian highlands from Pennsylvania to the Georgia, and moved west to the Mississippi.

The people of these four cultures shared many traits in common. Nearly all spoke the English language, lived by British laws, and cherished their ancestral liberties. Most dwelled in nuclear households, and had broadly similar patterns of marital fertility.

Four Regional Cultures in Anglo-America; A Summary of Cultural Characteristics, ca. 1700–50

<i>Location</i>				
Hearth Region	Massachusetts Greater New England	Virginia Tidewater South	Delaware Valley N.J., Pa., Del., N. Md.	Backcountry Southern Highlands
<i>Language and Literacy</i>				
Dialect	Northern	Southern coastal	Midland	Southern highland
Literacy (S) (m/f)	80%/50%	50%/25%	65%/33%	n.a.
<i>Architecture</i>				
Materials	Wood frame	Wood and brick	Stone and brick	Earth and log
Style	Saltbox, Stretched Box	Hall and parlor	Quaker plan	Cabin style
<i>Family</i>				
Identity	Strong nuclear	Extended	Moderate nuclear	Clan and derbfine
Cohesion	High	Low	Moderate	Moderate
Completed size (F)	7	3	5	n.a.
Servants (mean)	0–1	4–5	2	n.a.
<i>Marriage, Gender and Sex</i>				
Ceremony	Civil contract	Sacred ceremony	Meeting and agreement	Abduction Rituals
Mean Age (Ma) (m/f)	26/23	24/18	27/24	20/19
Adults, never wed (m/f)	2%/6%	25%/2%	12%/16%	n.a.
Male dominance	Moderate	High	Moderate	Very high
Prenuptial Pregnancy Rate (PPR)	Low (10–20%)	High (20–40%)	Very Low (5–15%)	Very high (40%)
Bastardy rates (B)	Low (7–10)	High (26–118)	Low (1–7)	Unknown
Penalty bias	Even	Against females	Even	n.a.
<i>Child Naming, Child Nature and Child Nurture</i>				
Origin of names	Biblical	Norman/Teuton	Mixed Biblical	Saints Names
Bible names (Nb)	90%	50%	70%	65%
Descent of names	2 generation nuclear	3 generation extended	3 generation bilateral	3 generation
Parent names (Np)	60–70%	20–30%	20–30%	20–30%
Child nurture	Will-breaking	Will-bending	Will-bracing	Will-building
Sending out	Yes	Mixed	No	Mixed
<i>Old Age, Death</i>				
Age ideals	Elder-Saint	Elder-Patriarch	Elder-Teacher	Elder-Thane
Age ideology	Veneration	Patriarchy	Eldering	Tanistry
Age heaping (A)	Old age bias	Seniority bias	no census data	Mixed
Death ways	Activist-Fatalist	Stoic-Fatalist	Optimist-Fatalist	Nescient-Fatalist
Burial customs	High austerity	High ceremony	Extreme austerity	Folk ritual

Four Regional Cultures in Anglo-America; A Summary of Cultural Characteristics, ca. 1700–50 (continued)

<i>Religion and Magic</i>				
Denomination	Congregational	Anglican	Quaker	Presbyt. etc.
Worship	Lecture-centered	Liturgy-centered	Spirit-centered	Field Mtg. and Fellowship
Magic Obsession	Witchcraft	Fortune	Spiritualism	Sorcery
<i>Learning and Literacy</i>				
Schools	Town schools	Parish schools	Meeting schools	Private schools
Common education	Strong	Weak	Strong	Weak
Higher education	Strong	Strong	Weak	Weak
Years enrolled (E)	4–5 years	1–3 years	3–4 years	1–2 years
<i>Foodways</i>				
Distinctive Dishes	Beans and brown bread	Fricasees	Cream cheese and dry beef	Clabber and potato
Cooking bias	Baking	Roasting and frying	Boiling	Boiling and frying
Eating Patterns	Age-dominant	Rank-dominant	Communal	Gender-dominant
<i>Dress</i>				
Class display	Moderate	High	Moderate	Moderate
Color display	Sad colors	Bright colors	Neutral colors	Folk colors
Sexual display	Moderate to low	Moderate to high	Very low	Very high
<i>Sport, Work and Time</i>				
Amusements	Town and team games	Blood sports	Useful recreations	Field contests
Work ethic	Puritan work ethic	Leisure ethic	Pietist work ethic	Warrior ethic
Economic bias	Mixed commercial	Staple farming	Mixed industrial	Farming & Herding
Time ethic	Improving the time	Killing the time	Redeeming the time	Passing the time
Seasonality (Tm)	Fall peak	Winter peak	Bimodal peaks	Spring peak
<i>Rank and Wealth</i>				
Rank system	Truncated	Hierarchical	Egalitarian	Segmented
Deference	Moderate	High	Low	Mixed
Wealth (G)	.4 to .6	.6 to .75	.3 to .5	.7 to .9
Inheritance	Double partible	Primogeniture	Single partible	Mixed
Land grants (L)	90–120 acres	674 acres	250 acres	n.a.
<i>Settlement and Association, Honor and Shame</i>				
Ideals	Towns	Manorial villages	Farm communities	Hermitage
Realities	Hamlets	Plantations	Farm clusters	Isolated
House location	Roadside	Setback	Corner-clusters	Creek & Spring
Intl. migration	Low	Moderate	High	Very high
Persistence (rPr)	75–96%	50–75%	40–60%	25–40%
Honor	Grace-centered	Rank-centered	Holiness-centered	Primal honor

Power, Order and Freedom

Local polity	Town meeting	Parish and court	Commission	Court
Taxes per cap.	12d (1765)	12d (1765)	5d (1765)	4d (1765)
Voting (%AWM)	20–30% and surges	40–50% and stable	20–45% and stable	15–25%
Violence	Very low	Moderate	Low	High
Crime index (C)	0.4	0.9	1.2	5.2
Order index (O)	.51	.31	.08	.25
Freedom ways	Ordered liberty	Hegemonic liberty	Reciprocal liberty	Natural Liberty

Definitions of Quantitative Indicators:

- A Age bias, computed as a ratio of the reported age to expected age
 AWM Voting participation as a proportion of adult white males
 B Bastardy rate, illegitimate births per 1000 total births
 C Crime index, ratio violent crimes against persons to crimes against property
 E Mean years enrolled
 F Completed family size, mean number of children born to all families
 G Gini ratio, ranging from .00 (perfect equality) to .99 (perfect inequality, the uppermost percentile owns all)
 L Land grants, mean size in acres
 Ma Mean age at first marriage
 Nb Naming patterns, proportion of biblical names
 Np Proportion of first-born children named for parents
 O Crimes against order, as a proportion of all crimes
 PPR Prenuptial pregnancy rate, proportion of first births within 8 months of marriage
 rPr Refined persistence rate, percent of living adults persisting through ten years
 S Signature/mark literacy rates, percent signing by mark.
 Tm Season of marriage, the timing of major peaks in the annual marriage cycle

Their prevailing religion was Christian and Protestant. Their lands were privately owned according to peculiar British ideas of property which were adopted throughout much of the United States. But in other ways these four British cultures were very different from one another. The more we learn empirically about them, the less similar they appear to be. The skeptical reader is invited to review the evidence of this inquiry, which is summarized in the preceding table.

☛ Other Colonial Cultures

The four major cultures did not embrace all of British America. Other cultural areas also existed. Some were of considerable size, though smaller than the major regions. The largest of these other cultures was New Netherland, which occupied much of the Hudson Valley. In 1700 Dutch burghers and boers were two-thirds of the population in Dutchess and Ulster counties, three-quarters in Orange County, five-sixths in Kings County and nine-tenths in Albany. They also colonized part of East Jersey, where as late as 1790 they were 75 percent of the population in Bergen County, and 80 percent in Somerset County.⁷

This was a very conservative culture. Its old-fashioned Dutch dialect survived even into the mid-nineteenth century. Its architecture remained distinctive for broad barns, hay barracks, step-gabled town houses, and low, narrow farmhouses with half doors. Settlement patterns retained a special character, with homes built in distinctive irregular clusters around a reformed church. Rates of internal migration were exceptionally low, and Dutch households had a different demographic profile from those of English neighbors, with fewer children and more slaves. In 1738, most Dutch families in King's County were slave-owners.⁸

This culture developed its own special ways of dealing with other ethnic groups. It combined formal toleration, social dis-

⁷Patricia U. Bonomi, *A Factious People* (New York, 1971), 22.

⁸Recent historical writing has been more interested in commercial and material processes; see Thomas J. Condon, *New York Beginnings: The Commercial Origins of New Netherland* (New York, 1968); and Van Cleef Bachman, *Peltries or Plantations* (Baltimore, 1969). The work of historical ethnography is only beginning; see Peter O. Wacker, "The Dutch Culture Area in the Northeast, 1609-1800," *NJH* 104 (1986), 1-21; *idem*, *Land and People; A Cultural Geography of Preindustrial New Jersey* (New Brunswick, 1975); Sophia Hinshallwood, "The Dutch Culture Area of the Mid-Hudson Valley" (thesis, Rutgers, 1981); David S. Cohen, "How Dutch Were the Dutch of New Netherland?," *NYH* 38 (1981), 43-60.

tance and inequality in high degree. The result was an ethnic pluralism that became more atomistic than in the Delaware Valley and more hierarchical than in New England. The peculiar texture of life in New York City today still preserves qualities which existed in seventeenth-century New Amsterdam—and Old Amsterdam as well.⁹

The culture of New Netherland did not expand far beyond its original boundaries. Its population remained small. In 1664, only 7,000 Dutch settlers (and 3,000 non-Dutch) were living in New Netherland. By 1790 only about 98,000 people of Dutch descent were living in the United States—less than one-tenth the population of New England, and a small fraction of the other major regional populations.¹⁰

Another distinctive colonial culture developed on the coast of South Carolina. Some of its founding families came from the West Indies; others were French Huguenots, and more than a few were emigrants from tidewater Virginia. Three-quarters of the low-country population in 1790 were slaves who came mostly from the Congo basin and the coast of Angola. These groups rapidly developed their own unique customs and institutions, which were closer to the Caribbean colonies than to the Chesapeake. Speech ways were heavily influenced by the “Gullah” (Angola) dialect of the black majority. Building ways were a unique amalgam of Caribbean, French, African and English elements. Patterns of settlement were marked by the highest level of urbanization in colonial America: nearly 25 percent of low-country whites lived in Charleston. The wealth of its white families was the greatest in the colonies (£450 in 1740), and highly concentrated in a few hands. The annual rhythm of life was regulated by a pattern of transhumance that did not exist in other mainland colonies.¹¹ This area became a distinct cultural region, but it never

⁹Differences between Dutch and English Calvinists prefigured those between Yankees and Yorkers. Besides the familiar texts such as Bradford's *Plymouth Plantation*, much manuscript material exists in English archives such as the Ralph Thoresby diary in the York Archeological Society. In 1678, Thoresby was in Rotterdam. “I could not but with sorrow observe one sinful custom of the place,” he wrote, “it being customary for all sorts to profane the Lord's day by singing, playing, walking, sewing, etc., which was a great trouble to me, because they profess the name of Christ, and are of the Reformed churches.” Ralph Thoresby Diary, 14 July 1678, ms. 21, YASL.

¹⁰The preferred estimate of 98,000 is from Thomas L. Purvis, “The European Ancestry of the United States Population, 1790,” *WMQ* 3 (1984), 98. Other estimates by Wacker, Hansen and Swierenga are a little higher—in the range of 100,000 to 110,000. The doubling time of the old Dutch population in the Hudson Valley was approximately 35 years, compared with 25 to 28 years for New England and the Delaware colonies.

developed into a major cultural hearth. As late as 1790 less than 29,000 whites lived in the South Carolina low country, compared with more than 300,000 whites in eastern Virginia and 450,000 in the southern back settlements (of whom 112,000 were in the South Carolina upcountry alone).¹²

Yet another colonial culture developed in North Carolina's Cape Fear Valley, where Highland Scots began to arrive circa 1732. Many followed after the '45 Rebellion, and by 1776 their numbers were nearly as large as the white population in the South Carolina low country.¹³ Other ethnic groups also settled in the Cape Fear Valley, but so dominant were highlanders that Gaelic came to be spoken in this region even by people who were not Scots. There is a story of a newly arrived Highland lady who heard two men speaking in Gaelic:

Assuming by their speech that they must inevitably be fellow Highlanders, she came nearer, only to discover that their skin was black. Then she knew that her worst foreboding about the climate of the South was not unfounded and cried in horror, "A Dhia nan fras, am fas sinn vile mar sin?" (O God of mercy, are we all going to turn black like that?)¹⁴

Even in the twentieth century, the Cape Fear people sent to Scotland for ministers who were required to wear the kilt, play the pipes, and preach in Gaelic.¹⁵

The political history of this culture was very different from its border neighbors. During the American Revolution the borderers were mostly Whig; Scottish highlanders were mainly Tory. In the new republic, the backsettlers tended to vote Democratic-Republican, and the highlanders of the Cape Fear Valley voted Federalist. Historian Duane Meyer writes that these people were "remarkably consistent in choosing the losing side." They never

¹¹M. Eugene Sirmans, *Colonial South Carolina: A Political History, 1663-1763* (Chapel Hill, 1966); Peter H. Wood, *Black Majority: Negroes in Colonial South Carolina from 1670 through the Stono Rebellion* (New York, 1974); Charles Joyner, *Down by the Riverside: A South Carolina Slave Community* (Urbana, 1984).

¹²The low country in 1790 was normally defined as the districts of Beaufort, Charleston and Georgetown. See John H. Wolfe, *Jeffersonian Democracy in South Carolina* (Chapel Hill, 1940), 5; Robert Mills, *Statistics of South Carolina* (Charleston, 1826).

¹³Duane Meyer, *The Highland Scots of North Carolina, 1732-1776* (Chapel Hill, 1961).

¹⁴*Ibid.*, 119; Charles W. Dunn, *Highland Settler: A Portrait of the Scottish Gael in Nova Scotia* (Toronto, 1953), 138.

¹⁵Personal conversation with Charles Joyner.

became part of the solid south; in 1900 they cast their ballots for McKinley rather than Bryan. Here was another culture that preserved its separate identity into the twentieth century.¹⁶

☞ Rhythms of Regional Development

Every regional culture had its own history, which unfolded in its own way. But all of them passed through a similar sequence of stages which created a powerful rhythm in colonial history. The first stage was the transit of culture from Britain to America, in which individual actors played decisive roles. In Massachusetts, for example, Puritan leaders such as John Winthrop and John Cotton shaped the future of their region when they decided to bring the charter of the Massachusetts Bay Company to the New World, to define church membership in a rigorous way, to create a standard model for town government, and to block the growth of a Puritan aristocracy in New England. In Virginia, Sir William Berkeley made many critical decisions when he recruited a colonial elite, encouraged the growth of slavery, drove out Puritans and Quakers, and discouraged schools and printing. In Pennsylvania, William Penn's decisions transformed the history of a region—in the design of local institutions, the recruitment of German immigrants, and the content of libertarian laws. In the southern highlands the backcountry “ascendancy” played a seminal role. All of these cultural leaders gave a direction to regional development.

The second stage was a cultural crisis of great intensity. It always began as an internal conflict among immigrant elites who supported the founding purposes of their colony, but disagreed on issues of authority, order, and individual autonomy. In Massachusetts, the crisis came with the Separatist challenge of Roger Williams (1635–36) and the Antinomian Crisis of Anne Hutchinson (1638–39). In Virginia, the critical period was that of Bacon's Rebellion (1676) and the violent repression that followed

¹⁶Many other colonial cultures in British America maintained separate identities and close relations with various parts of England. The longest and strongest of these associations was that between Newfoundland and the Dorset seaport of Poole, which may have begun as early as 1528 and survived into the twentieth century. F. W. Mathews, *Poole and Newfoundland* (Poole, 1936), copy in DORSRO.

(1676–77). Pennsylvania's crisis occurred in the 1690s, when William Penn briefly lost control of the colony (1692–94) and the Quaker colonists were deeply divided by the "Keithian schism" (1692). The critical time in the back settlements was the Regulation (1768–70). In each case a new clarity was brought to regional cultures by these events.

These crises were followed by a period of cultural consolidation which occurred in Massachusetts during the 1640s, in Virginia during the 1680s, in Pennsylvania during the early decades of the eighteenth century, and in the backcountry during the late eighteenth century. In every case, the dominant culture of each region was hardened into institutions which survived for many years. In Massachusetts, for example, courts, churches, towns, schools, and militia all were given their definitive shape in laws which were passed within the span of a few years, mostly in the period from 1636 to 1648. Something similar happened in most other colonies at comparable stages in their development.

This period of consolidation was followed by a complex and protracted process of cultural devolution. In New England, that trend occurred in the half-century from 1650 to 1700, when Puritans became Yankees. It happened in Virginia from 1690 to 1750, when Royalists became Whigs. It took place in the Delaware Valley during the transition from the second to the third stage of Quakerism, and the development of a more inward-looking faith in an increasingly pluralistic society. In the backcountry, it happened as backsettlers evolved into frontiersmen. In every instance, founding purposes were lost, but institutions were preserved and regional identities were given new life.¹⁷

¹⁷In New England, some historians of the Puritans understood this process as a great declension. But this captures only one part of a complex transformation, which included strong continuities and positive developments; the best accounts include Richard L. Bushman, *From Puritan to Yankee: Character and the Social Order in Connecticut, 1690–1765* (Cambridge, 1967); Robert G. Pope, *The Half-Way Covenant* (Princeton, 1969). A large literature has also been written on Pennsylvania, including Frederick Tolles, *Meeting House and Counting House* (Chapel Hill, 1948); and Gary Nash, *Quakers and Politics: Pennsylvania, 1681–1726* (Princeton, 1968); Alan Tully, *William Penn's Legacy: Political and Social Structure in Provincial Pennsylvania, 1726–1755* (Baltimore, 1977); on Virginia, Rhys Isaac, *The Transformation of Virginia, 1740–1790* (Chapel Hill, 1982), deals with a different subject. The transformation from Royalists to Whigs in the Chesapeake, and from backsettler to frontiersman in the southern highlands, still await their historians.

☞ Regional Conflict in the Colonies

From the start, the four major cultures of British America did not get on well with one another. Long before collisions of material interest developed, they were divided by conflicts of value. Puritan New Englanders detested the people of Virginia. As early as 1651 one Puritan observed of Virginians in general, "I think they are the farthest from conscience and moral honesty of any such number together in the world."¹ This attitude of moral disapproval toward the Chesapeake settlers was shared by the Delaware colonists. When a young gentleman of New Jersey was preparing to take a job in Virginia, friends warned him that "the people there are profane, and exceeding wicked."²

Virginians equally despised New England Puritans and Delaware Quakers. In 1736, William Byrd II expressed his contempt in a letter to the Earl of Egmont. "The saints of New England," Byrd wrote, "I fear will find out some trick to evade your Act of Parliament. They have a great dexterity in palliating a perjury so as to leave no taste of it in the mouth, nor can any people like them slip through a penal statute. . . . A watchful eye must be kept on these foul traders."³

One of the few points of agreement between Anglican Virginians and Puritan New Englanders was their common loathing of Quakers. However inoffensive the Society of Friends may seem today, they were genuinely hated in their own time as dangerous radicals, disturbers of the peace, and pious frauds and hypocrites who were said to "pray for their fellow men one day a week, and on them the other six."⁴

Many Quakers in turn not unreasonably developed an intense hatred of Puritans. Members of this sect which preached the idea of universal salvation made an exception for the people of New England. As late as 1795, a Pennsylvania Quaker collectively reviled all Yankees as "the flock of Cain."⁵

The North British borderers who came to the backcountry were heartily disliked by Puritans, cavaliers and Quakers alike. New Englanders regarded them as savages and barbarians. A Pennsylvania Quaker called them the Goths and Vandals of

¹George Gardiner, *A Description of the New World* (London, 1651), 92.

²Fithian, *Journal and Letters*, 62 (2 Jan. 1774).

³William Byrd II to the Earl of Egmont, 12 July 1736, Tinling, ed., *Three Byrds*, I, 487.

⁴Caleb Raper *Commonplace Book*, 1711, HAV.

⁵Joshua Evans *Journal*, 24.vi.1795, SWAR.

America; another described them as the “unlearned and uncivilized part of the human race.” Tidewater Virginians doubted that they were part of humanity at all; one cavalier defined them as “a spurious race of mortals.”⁶

The backsettlers reciprocated these opinions. In the Pennsylvania interior, the Paxton Boys slaughtered a group of peaceable Indians, and “made boast how they had gotten so many scalps they would go to Philadelphia and the Quakers should share the same fate.” There was also very bad blood between backcountry folk and the tidewater gentry in Virginia and the Carolinas, and between the North British backsettlers and New England Yankees.⁷

Familiarity did not improve these attitudes. On close acquaintance, various members of the four folk cultures were startled to discover how very different they were from one another. The New Jersey tutor Philip Fithian wrote to a Yankee friend about the Virginians, “their manner of living, their eating, drinking, diversions, exercise &c, are in many ways different from any thing you have been accustomed to.”⁸

On many occasions these antipathies gave rise to acts of violence. Fighting broke out repeatedly between Puritans and Quakers in central New Jersey. The inhabitants of the Delaware Valley and the people of Chesapeake region met in armed combat along what is now the Mason-Dixon Line. Backsettlers and tidewater folk came to blows in Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina and Pennsylvania. North Britons fought New Englanders in northeastern Pennsylvania and the Connecticut Valley after the Revolution.

These tensions were reduced by the simple expedient of physical separation. In the great American spaces, the four British folk cultures found room enough to protect their differences merely by moving apart. This process of spatial separation created a curious paradox in colonial America. “Early America,” observes John Roche, “was an open country dotted with closed enclaves.”⁹

To this general rule, there were many exceptions—notably in the seaport cities which collected very mixed populations. But in

⁶Charles M. Andrews, *Colonial Folkways* (New York, 1919), 235; Joshua Evans Journal, 24.ii.1797, SWAR.

⁷Rhoda Barber Journal, HSP.

⁸Fithian, *Journal and Letters*, 220.

⁹Conversation with the author.

relative terms, the urban population of early America actually declined during the period from 1720 to 1775. At the same time, many rural parts of British America grew more uniform rather than less so, and more fixed in their traditional ways.

☞ Regional Cultures and the Coming of Independence

In the mid-eighteenth century, the four cultures of British America suddenly faced a major challenge from a new imperial elite in London. This small ruling class developed its own special variety of English culture, which differed very much from the older folkways of British America. In the late seventeenth and eighteenth century, it invented its own distinctive language which is still the hallmark of England's upper class. To American ears, the salient feature of this speech was its very broad *a*, which is sometimes said to have been popularized by David Garrick on the London stage. That story may be apocryphal, but the broad *a* became fashionable during Garrick's life (1717–79). With other refinements of idiom and intonation, it created an elite dialect which promoted the integration of England's ruling few.¹⁰ It also increased the cultural distance between the few and the many.¹¹

This new dialect of England's ruling class differed markedly from the speech ways of American colonists, to whom it seemed contrived and pretentious. On the other hand, British officers who came to the colonies remarked that natives even of high rank seemed to be speaking in archaic accents of the seventeenth century. Loyalists who fled to Britain after the Revolution were startled to discover that their old-fashioned speech and manners were far removed from the latest affectations of London drawing rooms.¹²

The new speech ways of England's governing class were only one part of a complex elite culture which was also distinctive in its ideas of family life, marriage practices and especially its child-rearing customs. It also had its own ideas about order, freedom

¹⁰Another part of this speech way, now long forgotten, was the slurred *s* which came to be called the cavalryman's lisp. Perhaps borrowed from Castilian Spanish, this curious mannerism was adopted by England's equestrian class, and persisted in fashionable cavalry regiments even into the twentieth century.

¹¹Raymond Williams, "The Growth of 'Standard English,'" in *The Long Revolution* (rev. ed., New York, 1966), 214–29.

¹²Henry Van Schaack, *The Life of Peter Van Schaack* (New York, 1842), 162–63.

and power which became major threats to the cultures of British America.

In the century from 1660 to 1760 England's elite created many new institutions which still dominate the life of their nation. The regimental traditions of the British army were formed in this period. The Royal Navy, despite its claims to be the "senior service" founded by King Alfred, was largely a creation of this era. So also were many legal institutions; the rituals, ceremonies, architecture and costumes of English law still preserve the fashions of the century in which they were elaborately developed. In this period the Church of England created new institutions of evangelical Anglicanism, notably the Society for the Propagation of the Gospel in Foreign Parts. The Bank of England and many great commercial institutions were founded in the same time. A new national bureaucracy began its inexorable growth in Whitehall's neoclassical buildings. Above all these various institutions hovered the King-in-Parliament, an elaborately integrated idea of sovereignty that had scarcely existed before 1689.

These new ideas and institutions were no sooner formed than they were brought to bear upon the American colonies, whose independent ways appeared to be archaic survivals from an earlier and less happy age of strife and social confusion. As late as 1903, an English historian of high rank was still raging against the narrowness and provincialism of the American colonies. "There was not one of these communities," wrote Sir John Fortescue, "not even the tiniest of the Antilles, but possessed its little legislature on the English model, and consequently not one but enjoyed facilities for excessive indulgence of local feeling, local faction and local folly."¹³

England's governing elites mounted a major effort to bring the American colonies into line with the new national institutions. This challenge was not only political, but broadly cultural. It included proposals for an American aristocracy on the model of the Irish peerage; an American bureaucracy like that in Whitehall; and an American religious establishment like the Church of England. The folkways of British America were deeply threatened by these policies.

Shortly before the American Revolution, for example, the Anglican Society for the Propagation of Gospel sent missionaries to Massachusetts for the conversion of the "heathen." They built

¹³John W. Fortescue, *A History of the British Army* (13 vols. in 20, London, 1902), III, 3.

one of their missions not on the frontier but across the street from Harvard College and labored to convert the sons of Congregational New England. The head of this Anglican organization, Bishop Thomas Secker, made no secret of his contempt for the colonists, whom he collectively characterized in 1741 as "wicked, and dissolute and brutal in every respect."¹⁴ In 1758, this man became Archbishop of Canterbury and tried to create uniform Anglican establishments in the colonies. His grand design simultaneously posed a mortal threat to the Congregational orthodoxy of New England, the Quakers' regime of religious freedom of Pennsylvania, the powerful lay-vestries of Virginia, and Presbyterians in the backcountry.¹⁵

The new imperial elite also tried to force educational institutions and social structures in the colonies into line with its own ideas. The authors of the Stamp Act believed that

the Duties upon admissions to any professions or to the University degrees should be certainly as high as they are in England; it would indeed be better if they were raised both here and there in order to keep mean persons out of those situations in life which they disgrace.¹⁶

They imposed a heavy stamp tax of two pounds on matriculation papers, and two pounds more on diplomas "in any university, academy, college, or seminary of learning within the said colonies" (compared with two shillings, eighteen pence in England). To restrict the growth of professions, they placed a duty of ten pounds on papers of admission to practice law.¹⁷

They also attempted to restrain the institutional growth of regional cultures in even more direct ways. In 1769, for example, backcountry Presbyterians in Mecklenberg County, North Carolina, founded an institution (which still exists) called Queen's College. A charter was reluctantly granted by the North Carolina legislature, only after a "considerable body" of backsettlers marched on the colonial capital. When Queen's College began to operate it was the only such institution south and west of Williamsburg,

¹⁴Thomas Secker, *A Sermon Preached before the Society* (1741); reprinted in Frank J. Klingberg, *Anglican Humanitarianism in Colonial New York* (1940), 213–233.

¹⁵Arthur Lyon Cross, *Anglican Episcopate and the American Colonies* (1902, rpt. Hamden, Conn., 1964); Carl Bridenbaugh, *Mitre and Sceptre* (New York, 1962).

¹⁶Edmund S. Morgan, *Prologue to Revolution: Sources and Documents on the Stamp Act Crisis* (Chapel Hill, 1953), 57.

¹⁷D. Pickering, *The Statutes at Large . . .* (46 vols., Cambridge, 1762–1807), XXVI, 179–87, 201–4. (5 George III, chap. 12).

but it was one too many for imperial authorities. In 1773 after long delay, the charter of Queen's College was disallowed in London on the ground it gave preference to Presbyterians. At the same time, the Crown also disallowed an amended North Carolina Marriage Act which permitted Presbyterian ministers to solemnize marriages, on the ground that it did not give preference to the Church of England. These decisions became symbolic issues which infuriated the backsettlers and deepened their determination to "support the Government under which we find the most liberty," as one Mecklenberg petition ominously threatened.¹⁸

While Bishop Secker was trying to change the religious life of the colonies, others of the imperial elite reformed its legal institutions. Each cultural region had its own system of courts which had long remained in their own hands. Now Americans were given an expanded system of vice admiralty courts which operated without juries under Roman Civil Law which was alien to American customs. The colonists were also forced to deal with novel legal doctrines, and new hierarchies of barristers and legal officers.

England's imperial elite also mounted another assault on the political institutions of British America. The result was a decline in the power and autonomy of regional cultures. As late as 1660, for example, five out of seven mainland colonies in British North America had elected their governors. By 1760, only two out of thirteen colonies did so. The rest were ruled by royal governors, who had been appointed in London from the ranks of England's ruling class. One of these men, Governor Francis Bernard, was chosen governor of Massachusetts solely because he had married the cousin of a powerful peer. In 1774, Bernard formally proposed the creation of an American aristocracy. "A nobility appointed by the King for life, and made independent," he wrote, "would probably give strength and stability to the American governments, as effectually as an hereditary nobility does to that of Great Britain."¹⁹

These various challenges threatened all four American cultures at the same time. In response to a common danger, they forgot

¹⁸The leaders of this agitation were the Alexander and Polk clans. See Norris W. Preyer, *Hezekiah Alexander and the Revolution in the Backcountry* (Charlotte, 1987), 58, 72, 88.

¹⁹*Select Letters on the Trade and Government of America, and the Principles of Law and Polity, Applied to the American Colonies* (London, 1774); Edmund S. Morgan and Helen M. Morgan, *The Stamp Act Crisis* (New York, 1953), 14–18.

their differences and joined together in the movement that led to the American Revolution. The indigenous elites of New England, Virginia and the backcountry were united in that struggle. Only the Delaware elite was divided—not so much by their views of British policy as by their reluctance to use force against any provocation.

☞ The Revolution as a Rising of Regional Cultures

The Revolution was not a single struggle, but a series of four separate Wars of Independence, waged in very different ways by the major cultures of British America. The first American Revolution (1775–76) was a massive popular insurrection in New England. An army of British regulars was defeated by a Yankee militia which was much like the Puritan train bands from which they were descended. These citizen soldiers were urged into battle by New England's "black regiment" of Calvinist clergy. The purpose of New England's War for Independence, as stated both by ministers and by laymen such as John and Samuel Adams, was not to secure the rights of man in any universal sense. Most New Englanders showed little interest in John Locke or Cato's letters. They sought mainly to defend their accustomed ways against what the town of Malden called "the contagion of venality and dissipation" which was spreading from London to America.

Many years later, historian George Bancroft asked a New England townsman why he and his friends took up arms in the Revolution. Had he been inspired by the ideas of John Locke? The old soldier confessed that he had never heard of Locke. Had he been moved by Thomas Paine's *Common Sense*? The honest Yankee admitted that he had never read Tom Paine. Had the Declaration of Independence made a difference? The veteran thought not. When asked to explain why he fought in his own words, he answered simply that New Englanders had always managed their own affairs, and Britain tried to stop them, and so the war began.

In 1775, these Yankee soldiers were angry and determined men, in no mood for halfway measures. Their revolution was not merely a mind game. Most able-bodied males served in the war, and the fighting was cruel and bitter. So powerful was the resistance of this people-in-arms that after 1776 a British army was never again able to remain in force on the New England mainland.

The second American War for Independence (1776–81) was a more protracted conflict in the middle states and the coastal south. This was a gentlemen's war. On one side was a professional army of regulars and mercenaries commanded by English gentry. On the other side was an increasingly professional American army led by a member of the Virginia gentry. The principles of this second American Revolution were given their Aristotelian statement in the Declaration of Independence by another Virginia gentleman, Thomas Jefferson, who believed that he was fighting for the ancient liberties of his "Saxon ancestors."

The third American Revolution reached its climax in the years from 1779 to 1781. This was a rising of British borderers in the southern backcountry against American loyalists and British regulars who invaded the region. The result was a savage struggle which resembled many earlier conflicts in North Britain, with much family feuding and terrible atrocities committed on both sides. Prisoners were slaughtered, homes were burned, women were raped and even small children were put to the sword.

The fourth American Revolution continued in the years from 1781 to 1783. This was a non-violent economic and diplomatic struggle, in which the elites of the Delaware Valley played a leading part. The economic war was organized by Robert Morris of Philadelphia. The genius of American diplomacy was Benjamin Franklin. The Delaware culture contributed comparatively little to the fighting, but much to other forms of struggle.

The loyalists who opposed the revolution tended to be groups who were not part of the four leading cultures. They included the new imperial elites who had begun to multiply rapidly in many colonial capitals, and also various ethnic groups who lived on the margins of the major cultures: notably the polyglot population of lower New York, the Highland Scots of Carolina and African slaves who inclined against their Whiggish masters.

☛ Regional Cultures in the New Republic: The Constitutional Coalition, 1787–95

After the achievement of independence, the four regional cultures found themselves in conflict with one another. Even during the war, the Continental Congress divided into factions which were not primarily ideological or economic, but regional and cultural in their origin. Three voting blocs appeared: an "eastern" bloc of colonies settled by New Englanders; a southern bloc cen-

tered on tidewater Virginia; and a midland bloc which consisted mainly of delegations from the Delaware Valley. A leading historian of the Continental Congress has found that regional conflicts among these cultures were the leading determinants of Congressional voting on major issues from 1777 to 1785, such as oversight of the army, the taxing power of Congress and navigation of the Mississippi River.²⁰

So strong were these regional identities in the new Confederation that the British secret agent Paul Wentworth reported that the American states comprised not one but three republics: an "eastern republic of Independents in church and state"; a "middle republic of toleration in church and state"; and a "southern republic or mixed government copied nearly from Great Britain." Wentworth asserted that the differences among these American republics were greater than those between European states. "There is hardly any observation, moral or political, which will equally apply," he believed.²¹

The Constitution of 1787 was an attempt to write the rules of engagement among these regional "republics" of British America. The purpose of the Constitutional Convention was to create an institutional consensus within which four regional cultures could mutually agree to respect their various differences. In the Great Convention itself, some of the most important compromises were not between states or sections or ideologies, but between cultural regions.

A case in point was the question of representation in the new government. Edmund Randolph's "Virginia plan" was accepted as a basis for discussion, but required major modification before it was generally acceptable. The result was a series of compromises between big states and little ones on the two branches of Congress. Not so familiar, but equally important was another compromise between cultural regions. Randolph's plan envisioned a national polity such as Virginia possessed—an oligarchy of country gentlemen who dominated the legislature by long ten-

²⁰In the new nation, "eastern" usually meant New England. Not affiliated with any of these blocs were a few independent Congressmen mostly from Rhode Island, Maryland and the Carolina low country—the boundary cultures of British America. See H. James Henderson, "The Structure of Politics in the Continental Congress," in Stephen G. Kurtz and James H. Hutson, eds., *Essays on the American Revolution* (Chapel Hill, 1973), 157–196; and *idem*, *Party Politics in the Continental Congress* (New York, 1974); cf. Joseph L. Davis, *Sectionalism in American Politics, 1774–1787* (Madison, 1977).

²¹Paul Wentworth, "Minutes Respecting Political Parties in America and Sketches of the Leading Persons in Each Province," in Benjamin F. Stevens, ed., *Facsimiles of Manuscripts in European Archives Relating to America, 1773–1783* (25 vols., 1889–95), XVII, 487.

ure and infrequent elections. This system was alien to New England. Roger Sherman explained to the Virginians, "... in Connecticut, elections have been very frequent, yet great stability and uniformity both as to persons and measures have been experienced from its original establishment to the present time; a period of more than 130 years."²²

On this question the little state of Connecticut and the large state of Massachusetts voted together against Virginia. The result was a regional compromise of high complexity. Several generations of political scientists have misled us into thinking that the "great compromise" was mainly intended to mediate between large states and little ones. But the more serious task was to reconcile different political cultures in the four regions of British America. Regional compromises were also necessary on questions of representation, taxation, economic policy, slavery and ideas of law and liberty. In the great convention, as in the Continental Congress, the strongest voting patterns were regional in nature.

One region, the backcountry, was largely unrepresented in the convention. The federal Constitution was enacted mainly by a coalition of cultural elites from New England, Virginia and the Delaware Valley. It was generally opposed by the backsettlers, and by dissenting minorities in the various regions. Opposition came from boundary cultures between the major regions—notably the Clintonian elite of New York, the Chase faction in Maryland and Rhode Islanders of every description. But the dominant coalition of three regional elites supported the Constitution, and secured its ratification.

In 1789, the coexistence of the regional cultures was further protected by the Bill of Rights. A case in point was the first sentence of the First Amendment, "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof." This deceptively simple statement was another regional compromise of high complexity. Its intent was to preserve religious freedom of Virginia and Pennsylvania, and at the same time to protect the religious establishments of New England from outside interference. As time passed its meaning was enlarged; a measure which was written to protect regional pluralism became a basis for national libertarianism.²³

²²James Madison, *Notes of Debates in the Federal Convention of 1787*, ed. Adrienne Koch (Athens O., 1966), 195.

²³Madison's first draft of this clause embodied attitudes that prevailed in Virginia and Penn-